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Richard S. Williamson *
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has greatly expanded
its application of antitrust laws to state and local governments. These de-
cisions raise significant concerns about judicial interference with the allo-
cation of responsibility among units of government.
By applying antitrust laws to cities beyond any clear and manifest inten-
tion of Congress, the Court has ignored the tenth amendment' and in-
fringed on the flexibility and freedom of state and local governments to
carry out their responsibilities. This has chilled decisionmaking by elected
officials. Further, it ignores the distinctions between open, public decision-
making, monitored by citizens through the ballot box, and anticompetitive
conspiracies among competitors.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY
In the second half of the nineteenth century, a number of states passed
local statutes directed at anticompetitive pools, trusts, and holding compa-
nies. By 1889, however, a number of these anticompetitive arrangements
were interstate in nature and, therefore, beyond the reach of intrastate ac-
tion. This led President Harrison to urge Congress to determine whether
these private trusts were a matter of federal jurisdiction and whether legis-
lation should be enacted to insure competition in our economy.2
The consequent Sherman Antitrust Act3 grew out of procompetition
* Member of Illinois and District of Columbia Bars; Assistant to the President for
Intergovernmental Affairs.
I. U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."
2. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Sherman Antitrust Act, see 21
CONG. REC. 1765 (1890), reprinted in 3 AMERICAN LANDMARK LEGISLATION, HISTORY OF
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT OF 1890 (1976).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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state statutes and well-known, common-law principles condemning undue
restraints and monopolization of trade. The Act was directed against
private cartel structures and behavior, trusts, and combinations and
targeted individuals who sought to prevent competition and profit person-
ally from a noncompetitive economic order.4
Since 1906 it has been clear that a municipality can sue as a plaintiff for
violations of the Sherman Act and other antitrust laws. In Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta,' the city of Atlanta brought suit
against two Tennessee corporations which, in a previous Supreme Court
ruling,6 were held to be members of an unlawful combination. The city
brought an antitrust action when it was forced to buy water pipes at an
unreasonable price.
Thirty-seven years later in Parker v. Brown,' the Supreme Court ex-
amined the issue of the state as an antitrust defendant and established the
"state action" exemption. The case involved a suit by a raisin producer to
terminate an anticompetitive agriculture marketing program instituted
pursuant to a California statute. Although the Court assumed Sherman
Act violations would have been found if the program had been a private
initiative, it upheld the program, stating that there is "nothing in the lan-
guage of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose
was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature."8
During the next thirty-two years, the Supreme Court did not elaborate
on the "state action" exemption. Beginning in 1975, however, the Court
issued a series of decisions narrowing this "state action" exemption. In
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 9 a lawyers' fee schedule published by a
county bar association and enforced by the Virginia State Bar was held to
violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court found no evidence that
the schedule was instituted pursuant to a state command, such as a state
law requiring the use of fee schedules.
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,' ° a light bulb retailer challenged an
electric utility's program of giving customers free bulbs. The utility
claimed an antitrust exemption on the grounds that the free bulb plan was
4. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911); see also H. THORELLI, THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 27-30, 226 (1955).
5. 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
6. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
7. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
8. Id at 350-5 1.
9. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
10. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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included in a tariff approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission,
and that state law required the utility to obey the tariff. In the decision, the
Court noted that Michigan had no statute regulating the bulb industry and
no policy regarding such programs. Therefore, since the Commission's ap-
proval of the tariff could not be deemed the implementation of a state
command, there was no "state action" exemption.
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,' the Court unanimously held that the
"state action" exemption precluded antitrust suits by attorneys against the
Arizona State Bar, relating to an Arizona Supreme Court rule limiting
lawyer advertising. The Court noted that the Arizona Supreme Court had
promulgated the rule pursuant to its authority under the Arizona Constitu-
tion to regulate law practice.
The next year, the Supreme Court for the first time addressed the ques-
tion of whether the "state action" exemption provided immunity to munic-
ipalities from antitrust laws. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co. ,2 the Court, in a plurality opinion, ruled that cities are immune
only when they are acting under a state policy authorizing municipal ac-
tions in a particular area and when the state legislature contemplated the
action in question.
The cities of Lafayette and Plaquemine, Louisiana, which owned electri-
cal utilities as authorized by Louisiana law, brought an antitrust suit
against a competing, investor-owned, electric company. The investor-
owned utility, Louisiana Power and Light, counterclaimed, alleging that
the cities themselves had violated the antitrust laws by sham litigation, the
use of debenture covenants, and the tying of gas and water contracts to
electric service. The cities moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the
ground that Parker had rendered the federal antitrust laws inapplicable to
them as political subdivisions of the State of Louisiana.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that Congress never intended
to subject cities to antitrust liability. A plurality of the Court (Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Powell and Stevens) concluded that "the Parker doc-
trine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of govern-
ment by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public serv-
ice."' 3 The four dissenting members of the Court (Justices Stewart, White,
Rehnquist and Blackmun) expressed the view that federal antitrust statutes
have no more application to political subdivisions of the states than to the
11. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
12. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
13. Id at 413.
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states themselves under Parker. The decisive vote was cast by Chief Justice
Burger, who wrote separately suggesting that cities should be exempt only
to the extent that the state compelled their anticompetitive activity and the
city demonstrated that the exemption was essential to the state regulatory
scheme.
The fragmented Court in Lafayette made it possible to read that deci-
sion as imposing potential antitrust liability on local governments only
when they acted in a proprietary rather than a governmental capacity. 4 It
was unclear in Lafayette, however, what activities Chief Justice Burger
would consider to be proprietary and exactly what remedies would be
available against a local government. In addition, it was unclear whether a
state constitutional general home rule provision granting local governmen-
tal authority would provide sufficient authorization to satisfy the Parker
test.
The "state action" exemption was further clarified and narrowed in Cali-
fornia Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. MidcalAluminum, Inc. ,'5 where
the Court held a California resale price maintenance system was not ex-
empt. Although the system was pursuant to a clear California legislative
policy, the Court ruled that to be state action, the challenged restraints
must be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy,"
and must be actively supervised by the state. California did not "actively
supervise" the resale price maintenance system and, therefore, it failed the
two-step test and was open to an antitrust challenge. For cities, this may
mean that states can immunize municipal activities only by establishing
official affirmative policy and subjecting resulting city activities to state
review and oversight.
The Court went even further in Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder. 6 In this case, a cable television franchise brought an antitrust
suit to enjoin a city with home rule powers from imposing a moratorium
on expansion of the cable companies' business in the city.' 7 The city of
Boulder argued that because of the home rule amendment to the Colorado
Constitution, the moratorium constituted either the action of Colorado in
its sovereign capacity, or municipal action pursuant to a clearly articu-
lated, specific state policy. The trial court considered the Lafayette deci-
14. Areeda, Antitrust Immunityfor "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV.
435, 443 (1981).
15. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
16. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
17. Id On December 19, 1979, the Boulder City Council enacted two ordinances, the
net effect of which was to prohibit Boulder's current cable television company from ex-
panding its area of service for three months. The stated purpose of both ordinances was to
provide a moratorium on construction to give other cable companies an opportunity to make
proposals to enter the municipality's regulated market.
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sion and determined that Parker was "wholly inapplicable,"'I8 and entered
a preliminary injunction against the moratorium ordinances. On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed with one
member dissenting, holding that the city of Boulder was "exempt from the
antitrust liability under Parker v. Brown."'9 The majority found that the
city of Boulder was not engaged in the cable television business, and there-
fore had a governmental rather than a proprietary interest in cable
franchises. This was consistent with Chief Justice Burger's determinative
test for municipal exemption in Lafayette.20
The Supreme Court, reversing the Tenth Circuit, held Boulder's activi-
ties subject to federal antitrust laws, but did not rely on the proprietary/
governmental dichotomy articulated by Chief Justice Burger in Lafayette.
In Lafayette, Chief Justice Burger's approach was critical because the
Court was otherwise divided. In Boulder, however, Justice Blackmun, who
had dissented in Lafayette, joined the Lafayette plurality and concurred in
the majority opinion. The Court concluded that cities are not sovereign in
the federal system, and that the home rule amendments' "guarantee of lo-
cal autonomy" contained no "clear articulation and affirmative expres-
sion" of support for the anticompetitive acts at issue.2 ' Thereby, the
Supreme Court greatly restricted, for purposes of federal law, the ability of
states to delegate powers to their political subdivisions. The Court did not
decide whether the disputed ordinance must or could satisfy the Midcal
Aluminum "active supervision" test. In a concurring opinion, Justice Ste-
vens stressed the difference between the Court's holding that the city could
be sued under the antitrust laws, and a holding that the city had violated
the antitrust laws.
II. PROBLEMS WITH MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY
A host of practical problems is raised by the Boulder holding that sub-
state entities may be subject to antitrust scrutiny, regardless of the nature
of the activities they pursue, unless the activities have been expressly and
affirmatively immunized by state legislatures. The Boulder case opens pos-
sible municipal antitrust liability in a wide spectrum of areas including,
among others: solid waste disposal; transit service; ambulance service; op-
eration of municipal civic centers; city harbors; water supply; city off-street
18. 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1039 (D. Colo. 1980), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd,
455 U.S. 40 (1982).
19. 630 F.2d 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
20. See 630 F.2d at 708.
21. See 455 U.S. at 54-56. Thirty-five states have some type of constitutional provision
for home rule.
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parking facilities; taxicab franchises at public airports; and zoning to per-
mit or restrict residential or commercial development.22 Questions also
arise regarding procurement procedures and practices, including: public
works contracts; purchase of materials, supplies and equipment; and
purchases of real property, municipal liability insurance, and contracts for
specialized, technical or professional services. These activities are rou-
tinely regulated by substate governments.
The Boulder case creates added uncertainties and costs that can cripple
implementation of local public policy. The question of remedies remains
uncertain: will treble damages apply to cities or will special remedies be
devised?23 Municipalities are going to their state capitals to seek new leg-
islation to satisfy the Boulder standard. However, what will satisfy the
requirement that states "expressly and affirmatively" delegate activities to
cities? The "supervision" requirement remains unclear. Does supervision
by the state require a new cumbersome and costly state bureaucracy of
review boards? Since the city attorney will likely be named as a defendant
in any antitrust litigation, cities will retain outside counsel at great ex-
pense. And, if the city loses, will it be required to pay plaintiffs' attorney
fees? What standards of liability apply?
Under the language of Boulder, even states seeking to provide protection
to cities may be unable to write the legislation. As Janet Gray Hayes, for-
mer Mayor of San Jose, California, said,
The states, or anyone else for that matter, cannot know what to
do to meet the dictates of Boulder other than passing legislation
that mandates a certain activity by a city and that also expresses
the states' policy to displace competition in a way that is 'clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed' and that provides some
means by which the state will actively supervise the performance
of the city.24
That seemingly impossible task is further complicated by the retroactivity
of the Boulder case.
22. In November 1982, the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers published a
listing of 57 antitrust suits against municipalities involving various aspects of city services
and franchises. The list is being continuously updated. P. Maier, NIMLO Survey of Anti-
trust Suits Involving Municipalities, presented at the National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers 47th Ann. Conference (Nov. 7-10, 1982).
23. In congressional testimony, Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter indicated
that the federal government will not seek criminal sanctions against state subdivision viola-
tors of the federal antitrust laws. Local Government Antitrust Liability-The Boulder Deci-
siow Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 30,
1982) (statement of William F. Baxter, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Jus-
rice) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
24. Hearings, supra note 23 (statement of Janet Gray Hayes, Mayor of San Jose, Cal.).
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But the fundamental issue of municipal antitrust liability is not cost or
inconvenience. The fundamental issue is judicial interference with the al-
location of responsibility among units of government. Such allocations of
authority between the states and their political subdivision are a matter of
peculiarly local, rather than federal, concern. And, diversity among the
states in the allocation of that authority between the states and their polit-
ical subdivisions is a matter of peculiarly local, rather than federal, con-
cern. Diversity among the states in the allocation of that authority
historically has been viewed as a strength of America's federal system.25
William Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, told a
Congressional committee,
The Administration is firmly committed to the concept of feder-
alism, which lies at the core of our constitutional system. Its in-
tent is to develop policies wherever possible that will help to
restore the Tenth Amendment to its rightful stature, affording
state and local governments the flexibility and freedom from fed-
eral interference they require to carry out their responsibilities.
Thus, any potential for application of the antitrust laws in a man-
ner interfering with the relationship between states and their
political subdivisions is cause for significant concern.26
Unless Congress clearly and expressly passes legislation to preempt state
constitutions or state statutes, there should be a presumption of legality for
state laws. Justice Rehnquist in his Boulder dissent stated: "The Sherman
Act should not be deemed to authorize federal courts to 'substitute their
social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are
elected to pass laws.' ,27 The courts should give proper weight to decisions
made in the political marketplace. A state's decision to delegate certain
responsibilities to local governments by means of home rule laws, whether
through state constitutions or legislation, should be honored. The courts
should not distort the original intent of federal antitrust laws to reshuffle
the distribution of intergovernmental power.
Tom Moody, Mayor of Columbus, Ohio, pointed out,
City governments are natural monopolies established to protect
25. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote: "It is one of the happy inci-
dents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
26. Hearings, supra note 23 (statement of William F. Baxter, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
27. 455 U.S. at 68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
730 (1963)).
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the health, safety, and welfare of their populations. In the nor-
mal course of governing, governmental decisions are made,
which by their very nature, result in an advantage to one party, a
disadvantage for another, or a limitation in the operations of a
third party.28
Any local government abuses can be prevented by federal and state laws
such as civil rights laws under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,29 con-
flict of interest laws, sunshine laws, public disclosure of interests of public
officials, and freedom of information laws. More important, the public in-
terest is protected by the ballot box. Assistant Attorney General Baxter
noted, "there is a fundamental difference between public officials, who are
politically responsible to the electorate, and purely private businesses,
which are responsible only to their owners."
30
28. Hearngs, supra note 23 (statement of Tom Moody, Mayor of Columbus, Ohio).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
30. Hearings, supra note 23 (statement of William F. Baxter, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
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